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RECENT LEGISLATION 
FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-RECENT STATUTORY 
AMENDMENT IN NEW YoRK-After 128 years of criticism and confusion1 and 
enormous amounts of litigation,2 New York has amended its statutory rule 
against perpetuities. The old rule provided that the absolute power of 
alienation could not be suspended for longer, than "two lives in being" 
at the creation of the estate plus a minority exception in some cases.3 
Under the new rule the absolute power of alienation can be suspended 
for a period measured by any number of "lives in being" at the creation 
of the estate so long as they are not "so designated or so numerous as 
to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult." There is, however, still 
no period in gross provided for in the New York statutes. N.Y. Sess. Laws 
1958 (McKinney) chapters 152 and 153. 
This recent statutory amendment makes no primary change in New 
York's statutory rule against perpetuities other than to extend the per-
missible period during which the power of alienation may be suspended,4 
or within which a contingent future interest must vest.5 Therefore, the 
new amendment will not change New York's definition of the suspension 
of the power of alienation, 6 nor the concurrent requirement of vesting 
which has been read into the New York statutes.7 By extending the per-
missible period the new amendment will nevertheless give some needed 
relief from the harsh effects of the old "two lives" rule. A specific example 
of this type relief is found in connection with the statutory spendthrift 
trust. Since the equitable interests in most active trusts are made inalien-
1 "The Statutes of the State of New York Concerning Perpetuities and Related Mat• 
ters," SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE 
DOCUMENT (No. 65 H) 489 (1936); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§747-
750 (1915). 
2 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.16 (1952); 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 50 (1931); GRAY, 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§750, 871 (1915). 
349 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §42; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949) §11. Although the personal property statute refers to "suspension of absolute own-
ership" it would seem that this term is as broad as "suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation." See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §121 (1951). 
4See 28 MICH. ST. B. J. 17 (March 1949); 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940). 
Ii Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909). See 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940), 
22 HAR.v. L. REv. 520 (1909); 49 Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§46, 50; 40 N.Y. Consol. 
Laws (McKinney, 1949) §11. The common law rule, unlike the New York rule, is directed 
only against remoteness of vesting. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §191 
(1942). 
6 See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1418 (1956), for a definition of suspension 
of the power of alienation. 
7 Thus certain shifting or springing executory interests which are alienable will still 
be invalid under the new rule unless limited to vest within "lives in being"' at the 
creation of the estate. Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Railway Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 
123 N.E. 736 (1919). See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §122 (1951). 
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able by statute in New York,8 these trusts are void when they are so 
limited that they might continue beyond the permissible period.9 Thus 
a statutory spendthrift trust for the joint benefit of three or more living 
persons to continue until the death of the survivor was void under the 
old "two lives" rule.10 Under the new rule, however, such a trust will be 
valid because it must end within "lives in being." A power of appoint-
ment may now be limited to be executed within "lives in being," com-
puted from the creation of the power,11 and a trust, contingent interest, 
or sub-power created by a power will be void only when it may suspend 
the power of alienation beyond, or may not vest within, "lives in being" 
at the creation of the power.12 Since the validity of a limitation is normally 
determined as of the inception of the instrument creating it,13 it would seem 
that the old rule will probably still apply to all trusts, amendable or not, 
created prior to the effective date of the new act.14 
As the amendment extends only the permissible period allowed under 
the old rule,15 it follows that the prior decisions and statutes which have 
absolutely exempted certain interests from the statutory rule against 
perpetuities are still good law. In this respect the branch of the New York 
rule against remoteness of vesting will not apply to such interests as an 
option to purchase land, a possibility of reverter, or a power of termina-
tion even though these interests could be classified as contingent.16 Further, 
as the old New York rule against perpetuities, like the common law rule, 
was normally not applied to charitable trusts,17 the new rule will make 
little change in this area.18 Since a New York statute provides that a 
s 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§96, 103; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949) §15. Not all trusts suspend the power of alienation, however. See 26 ST. JoHN's L. 
REv. 247 (1955); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §ll8; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1949) §23; Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882). 
9 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.6 (1952). Perhaps the New York legislature never 
contemplated such a result. See 19 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1921). 
10 Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N.Y. 472, 28 N.E. 471 (1891). See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT 
2676, Appx., c. A (1944); 5 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1 (1930). 
1149 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §178. See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 
§25.19 (1952). However, the power of alienation is not suspended if a general power 
presently exercisable to appoint a fee is involved. It would therefore seem that in this 
case the period will be counted from the' exercise of the power. 
1249 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §179. See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 
§25.19 (1952); WALSH, FUTURE ESTATES IN NEW YORK §27 (1931). 
13 See 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945), annotation following §42. 
14 LooKER, "The 1958 Modification of the New York Rule Against Perpetuities,'' THE 
IRVING LAWYERS LETTER (1958). The effective date of the new amendment was September I, 
1958. 
15 See note 4 supra. 
16 Matter of City of New York, 246 N.Y. 1, at 30, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); Leonard v. 
Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858). See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1418 (1956). 
17 Matter of Crespi, 158 Misc. 383, 285 N.Y.S. 780 (1936); Matter of MacDowell, 217 
N.Y. 454, ll2 N.E. 177 (1916); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §113; 40 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §12. See WALSH, FUTURE ESTATES IN NEW YORK §32 (1931). 
18 The only exception being a gift to a charity on a remote contingency not preceded 
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direction for accumulations for a longer term than the minority of the 
beneficiaries is void as to the time beyond the minority,19 the amendment 
will make no change in the permissible duration of trusts for accumula-
tions.20 The new rule also makes no change in the law of successive legal 
life estates. A section of the New York real property law prohibits succes-
sive legal life estates from being limited to persons not in being at the 
creation thereof, and provides that where a remainder is limited on more 
than two successive life estates all the life estates subsequent to the two 
persons first entitled thereto shall be void.21 As this section applies to all 
legal life estates it could invalidate a vested remainder in a life estate 
which does not suspend the power of alienation.22 
From the scope of the amendment it would seem that there will be no 
effect on any of the prior decisions as to the proper construction of in-
struments affected by the statutory rule against perpetuities. Unfortun-
ateJy, however, the interpretative problems created by this amendment 
cannot be so easily disposed of. Feeling that the operation of the "two 
lives" rule was extremely harsh in a number of instances, the New York 
courts developed several constructional fictions to circumvent its harsh 
effect.23 Though not in accord with the weight of common law authority 
on proper methods of construction,24 these fictions became firmly established 
as the law in New York.25 A common example of a constructional fiction 
was the tendency to treat limitations as separable. Thus where a settlor 
created a trust to pay the income to B, C, and D, for life and upon the 
death of each to pay a proportionate part of the corpus to his issue or to 
others, this was treated as three trusts so as not to violate the "two lives" 
rule.26 Such separability has been extended to less obvious situations.21 
by a prior gift to a charity which was formerly invalid unless bound to vest within 
"two lives" in being, is now valid if limited by "lives in being." See SIMES AND SMITH, 
FUTURE INTERESTS §1417 (1956). 
19 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §61; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949) §16. 
20 However, if an accumulation is directed to commence subsequent to the creation 
of the estate out of which the rents and profits or income are to arise it may now com-
mence within lives in being, rather than two lives in being as required under the former 
rule, subject to the rule of restrictive minority. Ibid. 
2149 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §43. 
22 Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945), annota-
tion following §43. 
23 See note 1 supra. 
24 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, Part 4 (1951). 
25 34 CORN. L.Q. 270 (1948). 
26 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.24 (1952). 
21 Matter of Horner, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924); 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 245 
(1952). Also, where a settler created an inter vivas trust to endure for two lives and then 
disposed of his reversion for two additional lives, the courts may have held both trusts 
good. It looks, however, like the power of alienation had been suspended for four lives. 
See 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 785 (1948). In testing the validity of trusts of personal prop-
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Since these constructional fictions were adopted to avoid the harsh 
effect of the "two lives" rule it would seem to follow that they will be 
abandoned under the recent amendment,28 and that the New York courts 
will return to the common law methods of construction. Inasmuch as 
these constructional fictions are firmly established by stare decisis in 
New York as the proper construction of instruments in relation to the 
perpetuity statutes, however, this result may not follow as easily as some 
writers have assumed.29 The New York courts will, therefore, undoubtedly 
have to deal with a number of specific cases before the effect of the amend-
ment on these constructional fictions is finally settled. In addition to this 
interpretative problem there are other problems arising under New York's 
perpetuity law which are not reached by the amendment. As there is still 
no period in gross provided for in the New York rule, a statutory spend-
thrift trust for a flat term of years, for instance, is still void.30 It logically 
follows that since the power of alienation can be suspended for many 
lives in being it should also be suspendable for a given priod of time.31 
It likewise seems illogical that a future interest limited on a contingency in 
which no lives are involved should be void when the contingency is bound 
to occur within a reasonable period in gross.s2 
Despite these problems which the amendment either creates or leaves 
unsolved, there is definite improvement in the New York statutory scheme.33 
One of its best features is that the "lives in being" measure conforms to 
the perpetuity statutes of most other states as well as to the common law, 
making it easier to find precedents which will assist lawyers and judges 
in construing legal documents. As only two of the several states which 
once followed the old New York measure have retained the "two life" 
permissible period,34 this statute is in accord with a trend toward a return 
to the common law period of "lives in being."35 
Paul K. Gaston, S.Ed. 
erty the New York courts were able to avoid the "two lives" rule by applying out-of-state 
law where either: (1) the trust was created in another jurisdiction to be administered 
in New York, or (2) the trust was created by a New York domiciliary to be administered 
elsewhere. See 29 Sr. JoHN's L. REv. 247 (1955). 
28 See 43 CORN. L.Q. 703 (1958). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Haynes v. Sherman, 117 N.Y. 433, 22 N.E. 938 (1889). See 50 CoL. L. REv. 225 (1950). 
31 See 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940). 
32 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 6th 
series) 69 (1955). 
33 E.g., it no longer discriminates against testators with more than two children. 
34 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §500.13; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§33-261, 33-262. 
35 See 29 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 247 (1955); 38 CoRN. L. Q. 543 (1953); 46 HARV. L. REv. 
701 (1933). 
